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Respondents/Defendants State of Utah, Utah State
Insurance Department, and Utah State Tax Commission (referred to
herein as "State") respectfully reply to the "Rehearing Petition
of Appellant/Plaintiff Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Utah".
INTRODUCTION
This case originated with BCBS attacking the imposition
of a 2.25 percent subscription income tax on health care
providers under Chapter 37 of Title 31, Utah Code Ann., of which
BCBS is one such organization.

An identical 2.25 percent tax

was imposed upon the premiums received by insurers, which were
entities organized under a number of other chapters in Title 31.
However, in computing this tax, mutual benefit associations
("KBAs") were then allowed to deduct of the taxes paid on the
premiums received by the KBAs, thus in effect "exempting" the
KBAs from paying any tax on premiums the KBAs collected.
In its July 19, 1989 opinion, the Court gave an
extensive analysis to the two main constitutional challenges
brought by BCBS to the imposition on BCBS of the tax on premium
2
income while excluding the MBAs.
After reviewing the history of
insurers in the State, determinining the proper classes, and
subjecting the State's taxing scheme to a rigorous three part
For convenience, both the subscription tax and the premium tax
will be referred to herein as the "premium tax".
2
In reality, under the Court's analysis, there was only one
challenge, -- the "uniform operation of the laws" provision of
the Utah Constitution, since the Court determined that a law
passing muster under that provision would also pass muster under
the "Equal Protection clause" of the United States Constitution,
and the "private or special law" provision of the Utah
constitution is just the flip side of the "uniform operation of
the laws" provision.
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test, the Court upheld the decision of the District Court
granting summary judgment to the State.
BCBS claims that the Court has subjected BCBS to a
test —

the showing of economic disadvantage —

which was not

part of the law when this case originated, or was briefed, or
argued.

Thus, says BCBS, they never had notice that they had to

show economic disadvantage.

They then argue that despite their

not being aware of the additional test, they did, in fact,
-prove" economic disadvantage.

Finally, BCBS pleads that if the

Court rejects BCBS's first two mutually exclusive arguments, the
appropriate remedy is for the matter to be remanded to the
District Court to allow BCBS to present evidence of its economic
disadvantage in having had to pay the premium tax.
The State will address each of BCBS's points, and then
add some additional points.
II.

BCBS'S CLAIM THAT THE C0U5RT HAS ADDED A NEW ELEMENT TO
BCBS'S BURDEN OF ATTACKING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE TAX
BCBS argues that the Court has imposed a new element to

a party attacking the constitutionality of a tax —
showing economic disadvantage.

that of

BCBS further argues that because

its -competitive position in its market is obviously different
from that of Mountain Fuel's, the analysis used by the Court in
Mountain Fuel should not be applied to BCBS's challenge.
What BCBS fails to recognize is that the Court has not
mandated a showing of -economic disadvantage" to one challenging
the constitutionality of a tax.

In its opinion, the Court noted:

There is nothing inherent in the article I,
section 24 test as it was stated in Malan and
our other decisions based on equal protection
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or uniform operation of the laws principles,
[citations omitted] that expressly requires
us, in determining the constitutionality of
an enactment, to take into account the impact
of the legislative classification under
attack on those classified.
However, it
seems clear that the impact of a measure can
be relevant to determining whether the
legislative body has exceeded the bounds of
the broad discretion it has in fashioning
purely economic legislation.
(Slip op. at 13.]
Nowhere in its opinion does the Court hold that a party
challenging the constitutionality of a tax must show the economic
impact of the classification in order to challenge successfully
the tax.

The Court only says that such a showing would seem to

be relevant to the question as to whether the legislature has
exceeded the broad discretion it has in imposing taxes for
revenue purposes.
The citation to Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Salt Lake
City Corp., 752 P.2d 884 (Utah 1988) was not for the purpose of
imposing an ex post facto requirement upon BCBS.

The Court in

Mountain Fuel did not announce a new requirement to showing a
classification for tax purposes is unconstitutional.

The Court

there applied the basics of earlier cases cited both in Mountain
Fuel and in the instant case.

It certainly doesn't appear from a

reading of Mountain Fuel that Mountain Fuel thought it was being
blindsided by the Court's opinion.

Mountain Fuel had attempted

to show it had suffered economic harm because of the tax imposed
upon it but not on providers of certain other forms of fuel
competing with natural gas.

The Court applied the earlier cases

and determined Mountain Fuel had not met its burden.
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The same is true with respect to the Court's finding in
the instant case that BCBS had simply not met its burden
established by earlier cases enunciated by this Court.
Furthermore, BCBS was certainly aware of this critical element
when they originated this case and when they argued their motion
for partial summary judgment.

The gravamen of their case was

that they had been economically disadvantaged by their having to
pay the subscription tax.

BCBS even admits in the third point of

its rehearing petition that they attempted to make a case showing
they had been economically disadvantaged in having to pay the
premium tax vis-a-vis the MBAs which didn't have to pay that tax.
Their motion for partial summary judgment contained ten pages of
facts (R. 285-295), plus sixteen (16) exhibits of over 150 pages
(R. 330-454).

The District Court was simply not convinced BCBS

had met their burden of proof, and neither was this Court.
BCBS also argues that its market position is "obviously
different from that of Mountain Fuel's", and therefore Mountain
Fuel cannot be applied.

BCBS presents no facts or allegations to

support why it believes this conclusion is so "obvious"; perhaps
the reference is to Mountain Fuel's being a regulated monopoly,
whereas BCBS is not.

However, BCBS, as all insurers, is

certainly heavily regulated by the Utah Insurance Department, and
while it may not be a "state authorized monopoly", as Mountain
Fuel is, BCBS is certainly one of the best known and largest
health care insurers (using that term in the generic sense) in
Utah.

As for the dollar amounts involved, extrapolating from the

information in Mountain Fuel (752 P.2d at 886), Mountain Fuel
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paid taxes of $11 million over a five (5) year period.
varied from 6 percent to 4 percent.

The rate

If the average of 5 percent

is used, then the taxes paid of $11 million over a 5 year period
were generated from $220 million in revenues.

Extrapolating from

BCBS's own -facts" (and as is more clearly illustrated in the
next point), if the 2.25 percent premium tax paid by BCBS
totalled $5 million from March 1982 through June 1987 (when the
subscription tax and premium taxes were removed on health
insurance and similar insurance like products), then BCBS had
subscription income of over $222.2 million for that period of a
little over five (5) years, which, to use BCBS's phrase, is "what
most would consider to be a rather 'substantial' amount".

(Reh.

pet. at 7, fn. 2.)
The similarity between the income, taxes paid and
period of years between Mountain Fuel and BCBS are startling, but
probably irrelevant.

The District Court, however, and this Court

had the record available to determine whether based upon the
facts presented BCBS had sustained an economic disadvantage
because BCBS had to pay the premium tax and the MBAs did not.
Based upon the evidence in the file, both Courts found BCBS had
not met its burden of proof.
II.

BCBS'S CLAIM THAT IT HAS DEMONSTRATED THAT IT HAS BEEN
SUBSTANTIALLY COMPETITIVELY DISADVANTAGED IN COMPETITION
WITH THE NON-TAXED MBAS
After BCBS has taken two (2) pages explaining that it

was "surprised" by the Court's "requirement" that BCBS
demonstrate that it has been economically disadvantaged by its
having to pay the premium tax, BCBS spends three and a half pages
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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f

arguing that BCBS did, in fact, demonstrate that it had been
economically

disadvantaged.

It is in this part that BCBS takes

its greatest liberties with the facts.
BCBS asserts that "[i]t was not seriously disputed by
the State . . . that [BCBS] competes directly with two MBAs for
insurance business".

(Reh. pet. at 6-7.)

In fact, the State

argued strenuously throughout that BCBS doesn't really compete
with any of the MBAs.

The State filed a 45 page memorandum in

opposition to BCBS's motion for partial summary judgment,
including three and one-half pages of facts plus eleven pages of
legislative history.

As noted above, four of the MBAs are

captives, or provide insurance to employees of only one company.
Of the other two, one doesn't even write health insurance.

The

sixth, Gem State, markets only to smaller companies, a market
which BCBS tended to ignore until recently.
BCBS then cites the "evidence" of economic disadvantage
it presented to the District Court.
affidavits —

This consisted of two

one from a senior BCBS officer, and the other from

a senior BCBS actuary.

The Court, in its opinion, cited only the

former, twice correctly terming it a "conclusory affidavit" (slip
op. at 9 and 16). BCBS suggests the Court "overlooked" the
second, which BCBS deems to be "a critical piece of evidence".
In fact, the second only states that when setting rates, BCBS
»ust factor in the cost of the subscription taxes it must pay.
This rather unstartling revelation is somewhat akin to a store
stating it must take into account the cost of the goods it sells
when it prices them for sale to customers.

There is little

wonder the Court
made no mention of this second affidavit.
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As for the former memo, BCBS opines that "(t]he State
made no meaningful challenge to the adequacy of [that] affidavit
but rather filed a brief counteraffidavit alleging that at least
one small business had purchased its policy of insurance from an
HBA rather than [BCBS] because of a family connection with the
MBA, and not a difference in rates."

(Reh. pet. at 8.)

In fact,

the State countered virtually every assertion made in the first
affidavit.

That affidavit stated that without the premium tax,

BCBS believed it could successfully compete for the business of
several school districts, several subsidiaries of the Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, and a subsidiary of Utah Power
& Light Co.

To counter those allegations, the State responded

that since each of those entities owns its own MBA, it was highly
unlikely they would steer their business to BCBS even if BCBS
offered the same or even (up to a point) lower rates. The
affidavit then alleges that without the subscription tax, BCBS
believed it could have obtained the business of a number of other
entities that were insured by Gem State, and named eight (8) of
those entities.

The State refuted that claim through the

affidavit of the owner of one of the named entities, who said he
went with Gem State for reasons other than the "price of
insurance".

The State didn't believe it was necessary to counter

the claim of BCBS with respect to each of the companies named by
BCBS —

the one affidavit was enough to discredit the entire

claim of BCBS in that affidavit, because it refuted the assertion
made by BCBS that but for the premium tax, BCBS would have had
the business of all those named companies.
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BCBS asserts that the characterization of the first
affidavit as -conclusory" indicates an obvious -misapprehension
of important facts- by the Court, and that it further indicates
the Court -failed to consider the additional affidavits submitted
by BCBS".

(Reh. pet at 9.)

In truth# the Court correctly

identified the first affidavit as being conclusory.

It was also

self-serving, and was rightly disregarded by the Court as having
little merit.

As for "other" affidavits, besides the second

affidavit from the BCBS actuary, the only other affidavit
submitted by BCBS was from one of the counsel for BCBS, which
stated an article had appeared in a local newspaper, and the
article was attached to the affidavit.

(Ex. 13, R. 412.) The

Court, which correctly gave little mention and little weight to
the first affidavit, rightly ignored and gave no weight to these
latter two affidavits.
Lastly on this point, BCBS gratuitously alleges that
-the State (to its credit) never challenged [BCBS's] evidence in
the record below in support of the patently obvious proposition
that paying several million dollars not paid by one's competitors
in a fiercely competitive market constitutes significant harm."
However, while the State would like to accept this -compliment",
the facts prevent it from doing so. The State did concede, of
course, that BCBS had paid the premium tax, as required by law.
The State, though, not only never conceded, but in fact
strenuously rejected, the notion that by paying the premium tax,
BCBS was at a significant disadvantage with its competitors.

The

State presented the findings of the Legislature in 1969, that by
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

not subjecting BCBS to the premium tax being paid by virtually
all other insurers, BCBS was enjoying a significant advantage
over those other insurers.

The State argued that the captive

nature of virtually all of the MBAs, plus the restrictive nature
of their marketing, plus the small size of the MBAs, especially
when compared with a market giant such as BCBS, did not put BCBS
at a disadvantage at all.
IV.

BCBS'S CLAIM THAT THE MATTER SHOULD BE REMANDED TO THE
DISTRICT COURT
BCBS asserts in two places (Reh. pet. at 2, fn. 1 and

at 10) that in reality, all the District Court did was deny
BCBS's motion for summary judgment, and therefore, the matter
should be remanded to the District Court so BCBS can -put on its
evidence" to show that BCBS has suffered economic harm by having
to pay the subscription tax.

BCBS suggests that the granting of

the motion for summary judgment in favor of the State was "merely
a procedural aid to this appeal".
Of all the misstatements of facts made by BCBS
throughout these proceedings, the misstatements of fact in this
section are the most egregious.

From the beginning, it was BCBS

who pushed these proceedings along.

The record shows the

original complaint was filed September 24, 1982 (R. 2). On
October 25, 1982, before the State had even filed its answer,
BCBS filed its first set of interrogatories and requests for
admissions (R. 21, 18), and on November 9, 1982, filed its first
request for production of documents (R. 26).
The State filed its answers to the interrogatories on
November 24, 1982, (R. 36), and two weeks later BCBS filed its
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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motion to compel and set the hearing on that motion for the
following week.

The hearing was held on December 16, 1982 (R.

68), and the next day, BCBS filed its second set of
interrogatories and second set of requests for admissions (R.
69).

Both were answered on January 14, 1983 (R. 268, 272), and

six (6) days later, BCBS filed its third set of interrogatories.
On February 22, 1983, the State answered BCBS's third
set of interrogatories (R. 278), and one week later, on March 1,
1983, BCBS filed its motion for partial summary judgment (R. 281)
and set the hearing for March 14, 1983 (R. 457). The matter was
heard on March 22 and 23, 1983 (R. 546).
The District Court delivered its memorandum decision on
September 13, 1983 (R. 744) and the Order was entered on October
3, 1983 (R. 748). On November 10, 1983, the State filed its
motion for summary judgment (R. 768), and the matter was heard
and the Court granted the State's motion on November 14, 1983 (R.
771).

The Order was entered December 6, 1983 (R. 788), and the

notice of appeal was filed December 9, 1983 (R. 794).
There is certainly nothing wrong with a party moving
litigation along; in fact, it is to be encouraged, rather than
discouraged.

However, as illustrated in point II above, BCBS

knew it had to show some economic harm.

It certainly wasn't

enough to show that BCBS and the other hospital and medical
providers organized and regulated under Chapter 37 of Title 31,
Utah Code Ann, were regulated under a different chapter of Title
31 than the MBAs.

BCBS knew it had to show economic harm, and it

thought it had done so (Point III of Reh. Pet.).

BCBS had all
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the time it needed to discover facts to present in a motion for
summary judgment or at trial.

The State, while not dragging its

feet, constantly responded to the discovery requests from BCBS.
With the situation the way it was, the State never did conduct
any discovery, and its statement of points in opposition to
BCBS's motion for partial summary judgment was the first and only
attempt by the State to present any evidence or argument.

Yet on

March 1, 1983, only six months after this action was commenced,
BCBS believed it had conducted all the discovery necessary and
had all the facts it needed to proceed with its motion.

BCBS

presented ten (10) pages of facts in its memorandum in support of
its motion (R. 285 to 295), plus nearly 150 pages of exhibits (R.
330-454).

On the second page of its motion, BCBS admitted, as it

had to, there was "no genuine issue as to any material fact" so
that BCBS "is entitled to judgment as a matter of law" (R. 282).
If the record could be supplemented here with
affidavits from counsel for the State as to the role of BCBS in
having the State's motion for summary judgment filed, heard and
granted, it would clarify some points.

Since that is not

possible, the State points out that only a month after the Order
denying BCBS's motion for partial summary judgment was entered,
the State filed its motion for summary judgment.

Not only was

the State's motion filed on November 10 (a Wednesday) and heard
only four (4) days later on November 14 (a Monday), but the
motion and the notice of hearing were only mailed to BCBS on
November 10 (R. 767, 770). The motion itself is less than a page
long in substance, and merely says that all pertinent facts are
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Although no new facts or argument were presented in the
State's motion for summary judgment# BCBS did not object to the
lack of notice of the hearing, or lack of time to object to the
State's motion.

BCBS also did not produce any more facts for the

Court to consider.

BCBS was represented by counsel at the

hearing, and there is nothing to indicate that BCBS objected to
the entry of the State's motion for summary judgment.
What BCBS is urging the Court to do is to allow it a
second bite at the apple to present more evidence, now that two
courts have ruled it didn't meet its burden of proof.

BCBS could

have conducted additional discovery and presented additional
evidence before it filed its motion for partial summary judgment.
When that motion was denied, BCBS could have at that point
conducted additional discovery and presented any additional
evidence at trial.

BCBS chose not to do so, confident that this

Court would reverse the District Court.

BCBS had its chance to

build and present its case six (6) years ago, and chose not to do
so.

BCBS cannot now be allowed to go back and do what it had the

opportunity then to do but chose not to do.
V.

IF THE MATTER IS REMANDED TO THE DISTRICT COURT TO PRESENT
EVIDENCE, BOTH PARTIES WILL BE DISADVANTAGED BECAUSE OF THE
PASSING OF TIME
This matter began in October 1982, and was based upon

subscription taxes paid under protest by BCBS for the period
April 1, 1982 through September 30, 1982. The last such taxes
were paid for the period ending June 30, 1987, when the premium
tax was removed from all insurance and insurance-like products.
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In the affidavit which the Court rejected as
conclusory, and BCBS believes contained virtually all the facts
BCBS needed to prove its case, assertions are made that BCBS
could have won the business of several companies were it not for
the premium tax.
ago.

That affidavit was filed over six (6) years

Since the premium tax was removed effective July 1, 1987,

at best, information on what companies were contacted by BCBS,
during the time BCBS had to pay the premium tax, and what
companies went with an MBA and why, is over two (2) years old.
As stated above, the main target of BCBS, and the entity whose
operation understandably gave this Court the most trouble, was
Gem State, who marketed basically only to smaller companies.
Because they were smaller companies, it is likely that many of
are no longer in existence, and even more likely that many of the
people who would have made the decisions as to which insurer the
company chose to provide its employees with coverage are no
longer with the companies, and perhaps no longer even in Utah.
To impose such a burden upon the State, and upon BCBS at this
point, would be most cumbersome, unfair, and perhaps impossible.
VI.

IF THE CLASSIFICATION EXEMPTING THE MBAS FROM TAXATION IS
CONSTITUTIONALLY IMPAIRED, THE PROPER REMEDY IS FOR THE
COURT TO STRIKE DOWN THE EXEMPTION
The Court noted that the "deduction" for MBA premiums

under Utah Code Ann. S 31-14-1(1) (Supp. 1981) was technically a
deduction, but that since the deduction effectively eliminated
the premium tax for MBAs, it is a de facto exemption.
It is well settled that in tax law, if a classification
providing an exemption or deduction to a group is found to be
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constitutionally defective, the proper remedy is to strike down
the exemption or deduction, rather than expanding the exemption
or deduction to include persons the legislative branch did not
intend to be covered by the exemption or deduction.

(See Brief

of the State at 40-41).
VII.

CONCLUSION

BCBS knew it had to show substantial economic harm to
have the Court grant its motion for partial summary judgment.
This Court did not impose a new standard from the Mountain Fuel
case upon BCBS —

Mountain Fuel is only an application of the

same standards this Court has been applying for a number of
years.

Furthermore, BCBS did attempt to show by facts that it

had suffered substantial economic disadvantage by having to pay
the subscription tax while the MBAs did not have to pay the tax.
BCBS simply failed to provide enough evidence to persuade either
the District Court or this Court.

BCBS also had plenty of

opportunities in the District Court to conduct discovery and
present all the evidence it could.

BCBS should not be given an

opportunity now to go back and do what it chose not to do.

It

would also be most unfair to remand this matter to the District
Court to allow the presentation of further facts now, given the
amount of time that has passed since this action began.

Finally,

if this Court should be persuaded that the classification of the
MBAs for the purposes of exempting them from a tax similarly to
the subscription tax is unconstitutional! the proper remedy is to
strike down the exemption or deduction for the MBAs.
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The opinion of the Court should be reaffirmed without
rehearing.
Respectfully submitted this

day of September, 1989.

STEPHEN 6. SCHWENUT
Chief, Assistant Attorney General
Tax & Business Regulation Div.

CE ^
~
BRYCE
J^ "PETTEY
Assistant Attorney General
Tax & Business Regulation Div.
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